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Abstract
1 Introduction
Courtois and Meier introduced algebraic attacks on stream ciphers [9, 11], in which the keystream
is used to solve a system of multivariate polynomial equations relating stream ciphers initial states.
This method of attack was first applied to block ciphers and public key cryptosystems by Courtois
and Pieprzyk [8, 14]. Many regularly clocked linear feedback shift register (LFSR) based stream
ciphers have fallen to algebraic attacks since then, as demonstrated in [2, 3, 7, 14, 10], whereas ir-
regularly clocked stream ciphers have been more resistant. There are, to our knowledge, only three
papers [11, 1, 21] in the literature dealing with algebraic attacks on irregularly clocked stream ci-
phers. Each of these deals with separate classes of clock controlled stream ciphers. Our interest in
this paper is to examine the level of resistance of the LILI family of stream ciphers [20], particularly
LILI-II [6], to algebraic attacks.
There are two existing algebraic attacks on LILI-128 [11]. The first attack required about 218
keystream bits with an attack complexity of 2102. The other attack required more kesytream with
less attack complexity as opposed to the first attack. The keystream and attack complexity for the
second attack were 257 bit and 263 respectively. To date there are no algebraic attacks on LILI-II.
Our motivation in this paper is to investigate the resistance of LILI-II to algebraic attacks, and
to identify parameters that play a role in the resistance. At a result of the analysis we derive
a relationship between all the known parameters that provide resistance algebraic attacks. These
parameters include the size of the registers, the difference in their lengths, the degree of the Boolean
function used and the number of times the controlled register is clocked.
We show that the Boolean function of LILI-II is not an optimal cryptographic Boolean function
with respect to algebraic attacks. In addition we show that there exist many low degree annihlators
of the Boolean function used in LILI-II that annihilate the function to lower degrees. This has a
substantial impact in reducing the overall attack complexity of algebraic attacks on LILI-II.
In Section 2, we give a description of the LILI family of stream ciphers including LILI-128
and LILI-II. In Section 3, an algebraic analysis on LILI family of stream ciphers is outlined. An
algebraic analysis of the LILI-II stream cipher is shown in Section 4. Section 5 investigates the
resistances of other instances of the LILI family ciphers to algebraic attacks. Section 6 discusses
the importance of the key loading of the LILI family of stream ciphers in the resistance to algebraic
attacks. Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2 Description
The LILI family of stream ciphers are keystream generators using two binary LFSRs and two
non-linear functions to generate pseudorandom binary keystream sequences. The structure of this
stream cipher family is illustrated in Figure 1. The components of the keystream generator can
be grouped into two subsystems based on the functions they perform: clock control and data
generation. The l bit LFSRc for the clock-control subsystem is regularly clocked. The output of
this subsystem is an integer sequence which is passed through an r-bit function fc that controls
the clocking of the m-bit LFSRd. The function fc was chosen to be a bijective mapping so that
the distribution of integers c(t) is close to uniform. The output of the clock control subsystem
c(t) = {c(t)}ht=1 is a periodic integer sequence. The output filter fd is a cryptographic Boolean
function of degree d that takes w input bits from LFSRd. The contents of LFSRc and LFSRd at
time t are denoted as cti, . . . , c
t
l and d
t
j , . . . , d
t
m respectively for 1 < i < l and 1 < j < m and t ≥ 0.
The feedback polynomials of both LFSRs are primitive polynomial and the initial state of both
registers is not allowed to be the all zero state. It follows that both registers produces a maximum-
length sequence. The binary output of fd is the keystream bit z(t). After z(t) is produced, the two
LFSRs are clocked and the process repeated to form the keystream z(t) = {z(t)}inftyt=1 .
2.1 LILI-128 keystream generator description
LILI-128 is a member of the LILI family of stream ciphers first to be published [20]. LILI-128 uses
registers l and m of lengths 39 and 89 respectively. It has an internal state size of 128 bits and
128-bit of key size.
2.1.1 Clock Control Subsystem
At time instant t, the contents of stages 12 and 20 of LFSRc are used as inputs to the function fc
which gives an integer c(t), c(t) ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The function fc is given by
fc(c
t
12, c
t
20) = 2(c12)
t + ct20 + 1.
The output of the clock control subsystem has a period equal to Pc = 2
39 − 1.
2.1.2 Data Generation Subsystem
The data-generation subsystem uses the integer sequence c produced by the clock-control subsystem
to control the clocking of LFSRd. The contents of a fixed set of n = 10 stages of LFSRd are input
to a Boolean function, fd. The 10 inputs to fd are taken from the LFSRd positions (0, 1, 3, 7,
12,20, 30, 44, 65, 80). The function selected for fd has an algebraic degree of 6.
2.2 LILI-II Keystream Generator Description
LILI-II [6] is an instance of the LILI family of stream ciphers with larger registers and internal
state size of 255. The lengths of LFSRc and LFSRd are 128 and 127 respectively.
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2.2.1 Clock Control Subsystem
At time instant t, the contents of stages 0 and 126 of LFSRc are input to the function fc and the
output of fc is an integer c(t), c(t) ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The function fc is given by
fc(c
t
0, c
t
126) = 2(c0)
t + ct126 + 1.
Thus c(t) = {c(t)}inftyt=1 has period equal to Pc = 2
128 − 1.
2.2.2 Data Generation Subsystem
The data-generation subsystem of LILI-II uses the integer sequence c produced by the clock-control
subsystem to control the clocking of LFSRd. The contents of a fixed set of n = 12 stages of LFSRd
are input to a Boolean function, fd. The 12 inputs to fd are taken from the D positions (0, 1, 3, 7,
12,20, 30, 44, 65, 80, 96, 122). The function selected for fd has an algebraic degree of 10.
3 Algebraic analysis of the LILI family of stream ciphers
In this section we provide an algebraic analysis of the LILI family of stream ciphers. The two
algebraic attacks that have been applied to LILI-128 [11] provide tradeoff between keystream and
computational complexity requirements. While one attack requires less keystream and more com-
putational complexity, the other attack requires huge amount of keystream with less computational
complexity. The approach used on LILI-128 can be adapted to any member in the LILI family of
stream ciphers. These generalized attacks along with attacks algorithms are presented in the fol-
lowing subsections. Both attacks have a precomputation phase and run attack phase.
We show that to resist algebraic attacks, in particular, the one that make use of the way the
LILI family of stream ciphers are clocked, the length of both registers should be carefully chosen
and the difference between the sizes of two registers should be very small. In addition, we show
that the length of LFSRc should be greater than the length of LFSRd.
3.1 Finding Low Degree Multiples of f for LILI-II
The complexity of an algebraic attack is mostly dominated by the degree of the equations, the
lower the degree the more efficient the attack becomes. Hence, low degree equations are crucial
for algebraic attacks. Recently, more research have been conducted in the direction of finding low
degree multiples of a given Boolean function and resulted so far in various algorithms [17, 4, 5].
For a given Boolean function of degree d with n inputs, the complexity of the algorithms can vary
between O(M2) and O(M3) operations where M =
∑d
i=1
(
n
i
)
. This suggests that for some Boolean
function with large inputs, the complexity of finding low degree equations might be much complex
than performing the attack it self. However, the process is done once, therefore can be performed
in a precomputation phase.
We have used the generalized method explained next to find low degree multiples for the LILI-II
Boolean function fd. The well-known method for finding low degree multiples of a function involves
solving multivariate equations. The method starts by setting the degree d
′
of the function (s) g we
are looking for. Then we compute all the monomials up to the selected degree d
′
for n inputs. Then
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multiply each of the monomials in lexicographic order with f . Once the multiplication is complete,
for each multiplication result, discard all the terms of order less than d
′
. Terms of degree d
′′
such
that d
′
≤ d
′′
≤ d are only selected from each multiplication. Then a matrix is formed with entries
that compose of all the monomials from degrees d
′′
up to d. Finally the solution colum is set to
zero and the matrix is solved. The solution of the matrix is a combination of all possible g(s) a
function f can have. The following algorithm illustrates the steps :
Inputs : A Boolean function f with n input variables, degree d
′
of g desired
Outputs: Functions g(s) of degree d
′
and h such that fg = h
1. Compute all monomials up to degree d
′
,
∑d′
i=1
(
n
i
)
.
2. Multiply f with each of the computed monomials from step 1 in lexico-
graphic order.
3. For each product multiplication result, discard all the terms of order less
than d
′
.
4. Compute monomials of terms from degree d
′
up to d.
5. Solve a matrix composed of all the monomials computed in the previous
step after setting Set the solution colum to zero.
6. The solution gives a vector space of the coefficients of the monomials
that give you low degree multiples.
7. Reconstruct the multiples from the monomials and the coefficient vectors
in that space.
3.2 First algebraic attack
In the first algebraic attack on the LILI family, the internal state of register LFSRc is guessed,
revealing the clocking pattern of LFSRd. A system of equations is constructed in the unknowns
from LFSRd. In the precomputation phase, the lowest degree possible multiples g of f are first
searched for. The run attack phase steps are shown in the following algorithm :
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Inputs : Feedback polynomials of LFSRc and LFSRd of lengths l and m
respectively and
∑d
i=1
(
m
i
)
segments of keystream
Outputs: Internal state bits of the cipher
• Guess the contents of LFSRc
1. Generate
∑d
i=1
(
m
i
)
equations from register LFSRd using its prim-
itive polynomial by clocking LFSRd according to the output of
fc.
2. Solve the system of equations generated by substituting keystream
into equations from 1, to find the internal state of LFSRd.
3. Reconstruct a segment of keystream using the recovered internal
state bits of LFSRd and the guessed bits of LFSRc.
4. Check a segments of the reconstructed keystream bits if it agrees
with a segments of the observed ones.
5. If success, exit with guessed LFSRc and computed LFSRd.
6. Else proceed to step1.
The complexity of this attack is dominated by the length of LFSRc, the degree of the equations
generated in step 1 of the algorithm and the number of monomials in the system of equations solved
in step 3 of the algorithm. The number of monomials is given byM =
∑d
i=1
(
m
d
)
. The computational
complexity for solving such system of equations is given by complexity Mω, with 2 ≤ ω ≤ 3. It
is clear that in order for this attack to be less efficient than a brute force attack, the following
parameters must be satisfied
2l − 1
[
d∑
i=1
(
m
d
)]ω
> (2k − 1) (1)
where k is the secret key size.
3.3 Second algebraic attack
In the second algebraic attack, the attacker make use of the way the LILI family of ciphers are
clocked to mount an attack that requires less computational complexity and more keystream bits
than for the first attack. In [19], the author showed a lemma that can be used to work out how many
times is LFSRd is exactly stepped for one period of LFSRc. This can be used to avoid guessing
the contents of LFSRc and obtain an output as if the second register was regularly clocked every
∆d cycles. This approach can be adopted for any cipher in the LILI family. Given the length of
LFSRc, the number of inputs r of the Boolean function fc, it can easily be computed how many
times ∆d, that LFSRd is advanced for one period of LFSRc.
∆d = (2
l−r − 1) +
2r∑
s=2
s ∗ 2l−r (2)
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As with the first attack, in the precomputation phase, the lowest degree multiple of g is computed
as well as the values for ∆d. In addition,
∑d
i=1
(
m
i
)
equations are sampled from LFSRd every ∆d.
In [19], two ways were suggested for stepping LFSRd ∆d number of positions forward or backward.
In the first way, a vector-matrix multiplication is performed with a precomputed 127*127 bit matrix
over GF (2). Or by using a multiplication algorithm in GF (2127).
The steps of the run attack phase of this approach are shown in the following algorithm:
Inputs:
∑d
i=1
(
m
i
)
segments of equations and keystream obtained from the
precomputation phase
Outputs: Internal state bits of the cipher
1. Substitute for the keystream in their intended position.
2. Solve the system of equations to recover the internal state of LFSRd.
3. Once, internal state of LFSRd is recovered, recover the internal state of
LFSRc.
The total attack complexity of this approach depends on the complexity of recovering the
internal state bit of LFSRd and on the maximum number of that can be generated from LFSRd.
Let T denote the number of keystream bits needed for the attack to be successful. This depends
on the length of LFSRd and on the overall degree of the generated equations. Generally,
T = (2l − 1)
d∑
i=1
(
m
d
)
(3)
as an output can be used every 2l − 1 cycles of LFSRc. The number of keystream bits can be
further reduced by the number of n independent multipliers of low degree found on f which gives
T =
[
(2l − 1)
d∑
i=1
(
m
d
)]
/n
The number of equations that can be generated from LFSRd can be computed as follows. For each
period of LFSRc, we can only use one output or equation every ∆d and since in one period of the
LFSRd we get about 2
m − 1 equations can be obtained due to the use of a primitive polynomial
and a balanced Boolean function f . The relations between the total number of equations E is given
by
E = (2m − 1)/gcd((∆d, 2
m − 1)) (4)
Where gcd is the great common divisor. For this form of an algebraic attack to work, the
number of equations must be greater or equal to the number of keystream bits as indicated in the
following relation
(2m − 1)/Gcd(((∆d , 2
m − 1)) ≥ (2l − 1)
d∑
i=1
(
m
d
)
(5)
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The resistance of the LILI family of stream ciphers to both algebraic attacks depends on the
number of times register LFSRd is clocked, the degree of the Boolean function used, and the length
of both of the registers.
4 Algebraic analysis on LILI-II stream cipher
In this section, we examine the resistance of LILI-II against algebraic attacks. We also compute
the number of multipliers g of low degree found on fd. This has a great impact on reducing the
overall degree of the equations and thus the complexity of an algebraic attack.
4.1 Algebraic attack on LILI-II
In this section we assess the level of resistance of LILI-II to algebraic attacks. We first show that
the Boolean function fd of LILI-II has an algebraic immunity AI of 4. An algebraic immunity AI
of a Boolean function f is the degree of the minimum degree annihilator(s) among all the nonzero
annihilators of f and 1+ f . Where an annihilator of a Boolean function f is defined as a non zero
function g of f if fg = 0 [16, 17]. As fd has been found to have an IA(4), this means that the
degree of fd can be reduced from degree 10 to 4.
The algebraic normal form of fd is computed for the first time and shown in appendix A. We
can see that multiplying fd with (x11+1)(x7+1), a degree 4 function emerges reduced from degree
10. This g has degree 2 and fg has degree 4. The relation below is the result of the multiplication
(x11 + 1)(x7 + 1)fd = x2x4x7x11 + x3x7x8x11 + x1x7x9x11 + x7x10x11x12
+x2x4x7 + x3x7x8 + x1x7x9 + x2x4x11 + x1x7x11 + x2x7x11
+x3x7x11 + x4x7x11 + x5x7x11 + x6x7x11 + x3x8x11 + x7x8x11
+x1x9x11 + x7x9x11 + x7x10x11 + x7x10x12
+x10x11x12 + x2x4 + x1x7 + x2x7 + x3x7 + x4x7 + x5x7 + x6x7
+x3x8 + x7x8 + x1x9 + x7x9 + x7x10 + x1x11 + x2x11 + x3x11
+x4x11 + x5x11 + x6x11 + x7x11 + x8x11 + x9x11 + x10x11 + x10x12
+x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x11 + 1 (6)
To work out the algebraic attacks complexity, the number of monomials has to be first com-
puted. The number of monomials LILI-II is expected to have for d = 10 is M =
∑
10
i=1
(
127
i
)
= 247.7
with solving complexity of 2143.1 for ω = 3. Substituting parameters into equation (1) gives total
attack complexity of 2128.2143 = 2271. However, by reducing the overall degree of fd of LILI-II, the
attack complexity reduced to 2198. LILI-II uses a secret key of length k = 128 which means that
conducting the first algebraic attack on LILI-II is much worse than exhaustive keysearch.
For the second algebraic attack, ∆d is first computed using equation (2). For the given parama-
tres of LILI-II, r = 2, l = 128 and m = 127, ∆d is worked out to be 2
129. The amount of keystream
needed for the attack is computed using equation (3) to be T = 2151. There are about E = 2127−1
equations that can be generated meaning that the relation of (5) is not satisfied. Therefore, the
second algebraic attacks on LILI-II is not practical.
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5 Investigating the resistance of other instances of the LILI family
ciphers to algebraic attacks
An interesting feature in the LILI family of stream ciphers is that it is a paramatizable one. This
widens the choices for any one who wants to use any member of the family based on the availabe
hardware resources. So it makes sence to vary the internal state size and registers size and identify
which LILI instances becomes prone to algebraic attacks. We examined the parameters derived in
equations (1) and (5) on other instances of LILI-II family of stream ciphers by verifying parameters
such as register lengths, but preserving the internal state size. The key size is fixed to 128 bits and
maintain a total internal state size of 255 bits. We give an estimate of the keystream requirements
and attack complexity for different sized registers using the reduced degree d = 4 Boolean function.
Tables 2 and 3 provide the data obtained for the first and second attacks.
d l m keystream - T Attack complexity
4 107 148 O(224) bits 2179
4 108 147 O(224) bits 2180
4 118 137 O(223) bits 2187
4 119 136 O(223) bits 2188
4 127 128 O(223) bits 2196
4 128 127 O(223) bits 2197
Table 1: First algebraic attack on LILI-II with different register sizes
d l m T E Attack complexity
4 107 148 2131 bits 2148 273
4 108 147 2132 bits 2147 272.5
4 109 146 2133 bits 2146 272.4
4 110 145 2134 bits 2145 272.3
4 111 144 2135 bits 2144 272.2
4 116 139 2140 bits 2139 271.8
4 117 138 2141 bits 2138 271.7
4 118 137 2142 bits 2137 271.6
4 119 136 2143 bits 2136 271.5
4 127 128 2150 bits 2128 270
4 128 127 2151 bits 2127 270
Table 2: Second algebraic attack on LILI-II with different register size
For all register sizes considered, the LILI family is resistant to the first algebraic attack. How-
ever, for 107 ≤ l ≤ 115, the LILI family is prone to the second algebraic attacks. The second
algebraic attack is possible on all register lengths if the effect of the filer function is deleted. This
can be thought of as an improved algebraic attacks on clock controlled generators that compose
of a single register controlling other registers and the output of the system is just modulo sum of
registers outputs, see for example [1].
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6 Key Loading and Re-keying of the LILI-II and algebraic attacks
To date, most of the proposed algebraic attacks aim at recovering the internal state of the ciphers
rather than the key bits directly. However, many of the recently proposed stream ciphers uses an
internal state size that is at least as twice as large as the key size for security and efficiency reasons.
Our main aim in this section is to take the other approach and examine the feasibility of recovering
the key bits directly instead of recovering the internal state bits using algebraic attacks and identify
the role the key loading process in the attack.
As the size of the key used in many ciphers is at least half the size of the internal state, meaning
that we can work with less number of unknowns. Consider the following scenarios. In the first
scenario, we ignore the key loading phase and start with the internal state. Assume that we can
algebraically represent the cipher, then we will end up with a total number of variables of 256
with a maximum degree of equations equal to l + 4. In the second scenario, we go through the
key loading phase and start the keystream generation phase, then in this case we end up with 128
unknown key variables and known initialization vectors. Thus the maximum number of variables
we are working with is 128 with a maximum degree of l. This implies that every bit guess reduces
the overall degree of the equations by 1. This also implies that guessing the contents of LFSRc
results in the bits been guessed in LFSRd.
Many keys loading process is done in an ad-hoc way. There is little literature on the design
criteria of key loading. We also aim at investigating whether the way the initialization vectors bits
and key bits are introduced into the LILI-II facilitates or resist algebraic attacks. What is the best
way of introducing key and initialization vector into the cipher and does it make any difference for
LILI-II.
In terms of the second algebraic attack, it makes it even harder than the first attack as it will
be explained in more details later on. The quetions is how to algebraically represent LILI-II. In [1]
a general method was shown on obtaining such relations for irregularly clocked controlled stream
ciphers. We adopt the method and modify it for LILI-II as shown in the next subsection. After
introducing the way the key loading of LILI-II is performed, we algebraically represent the cipher
and generate equations in terms of the key bits. Then algebraically analyse what happens if we
takes this approach. Finally analyse different key loading scheme and level of resistance provided
against algebraic attacks.
6.1 Key Loading and Re-keying of the LILI-II
The initial state for the keystream generator is generated as follows. The starting state of LFSRc
is obtained by XORing the two 128-bit binary strings ki and vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 128, where v is an
initialization vector bit. On the other hand, the starting state of LFSRd is obtained by deleting
the first bit of ki and the last bit of vi, and XORing the two resulting 127-bit binary strings. The
cipher is then run to produce an output string of length 255 bits. The first 128 bits of this output
string are used to form the initial state of LFSRc, and the remaining 127 bits are used to form the
initial state of LFSRd. The cipher is run again to produce an output string of length 255 bits. The
output of the second 255 run is used to form the initial state of the keystream generator when we
begin keystream production. As previously, the first 128 bits form the initial state of LFSRc, and
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the remaining 127 bits form the initial state of LFSRd. Since in our approach we aim at generating
equations in terms of key bits, we have to be able to obtain relations that describe the cipher, hold
true for every output bit and takes into account the clocking control mechanism used in LILI-II.
6.2 Algebriac representation for LILI-II
One way for obtaining the desired relations is by incorporating the clock control outputs from
LFSRc as variables into LFSRd. Given fc we can obtain the relations between the bits c
t
0, c
t
126,
the number of times register LFSRd is clocked and the initial state of LFSRd as shown below: -
dt+1i =


dti−1 c
t
0 = 0, c
t
126 = 0
dti−2 c
t
0 = 0, c
t
126 = 1
dti−3 c
t
0 = 1, c
t
126 = 0
dti−4 c
t
0 = 1, c
t
126 = 1
This can be represented in an algebraic expression as follows
dt+1i = (c
t
0 + 1)(c
t
126 + 1)d
t
i−1 + (c
t
0 + 1)c
t
126d
t
i−2 + c
t
0(c
t
126 + 1)d
t
i−3 + c
t
0c
t
126d
t
i−4 (7)
As it can be seen that in the above expressions the internal state of LFSRd and LFSRc will
containg initialization vector bits and unknown key variables. From equation (7), it can be seen
that the degree of the equations in LFSRd increases by two at each successive clock, since LFSRc
is regularly clocked, thus an increase by two in the output equations.
6.3 Key Loading of the LILI-II and resistance to both algebraic attacks
From the previous section it can be seen that the maximum degree of the equations to be generated
from such setup is dmax = l and the total number of monomials expected to appear in the system
of equations is therefore
Mmax =
dmax∑
i=1
(
128
i
)
For a successful algebraic attack on any ciphers, and on LILI-II in particular after going through
the key loading process, we need to be able to reduce the degree of the equations to as low as
possible. One way of achieving this is by using low degree annihilators.
As we saw in Section 4.1 that we can reduce fd to degree 4 function. We have also found the
following multiples. Recall equation (7), now consider multiplying it with ct0 or c
t
126 or combinations
of them. If for instance it is multiplied with ct0c
t
126 equation (7) becomes
ct0c
t
126d
t+1
i = c
t
0c
t
126d
t
i−4
The multiples dramatically reduce the number of terms in the system of equations but will not help
in reducing the overall degree of the equations as each contents of LFSRd is a combination of high
degree terms. The only way to make use of the annihilator is if the clocking of LFSRd becomes
known to us. One way of making the clocking of LFSRd known to us is by guessing the contents
of LFSRc which this lead us to the first algebraic attack.
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The idea of the guessing and solving approach seems more promising after the key loading take
place. For example, we saw from Section 4, that for the first algebraic attack on LILI-II, the best
attack complexity we can get after guessing 128 bits and using d = 4 is 2197. However, if we guess
about 124 of key bits (after the registers are filled with known initialization vectors and unknown
key variables) we can get an attack complexity at most 2124.M3 = 2135, for M =
∑
4
i=1
(
4
1
)
which is
a huge improvement over the later attack and directly reveal the key bits, still higher than brute
force on the key. If the key loading phase needed in say m key bits to be in LFSRc, for m < k/4,
then guessing 2m will make the stepping of LFSRd predictable. However, we will come to the
problem of solving high degree equations from LFSRd.
The other approach is to apply the second algebraic attack which encounters the following
problems. The first problem is that as pointed out earlier that each content of LFSRd after the
key loading phase will contain equations of high degree, most probably higher than 80. Then the
contents of 12 stages are filtered using a degree 4 equations to end up with degree 84 equations in
128 unknowns which is not feasible to solve.
To summarise, the first algebraic attack looks more efficient after generating equations in terms
of the key bits. However, the complexity will be higher than exhaustive keysearch. Unlike the first
algebraic attack in Section 5, some instances of the LILI family stream ciphers become prone to the
second attack; however, in the case of generating equations in terms of key bits the second attack
is easily defeated on LILI-II and all instances of the LILI family of stream ciphers. To investigate
our final aim, we will consider three different scenarios of introducing the initialization vector and
key bits into the cipher. The expected degree of equations to appear in both registers during the
key loading phase of LILI-II is shown in Figure 1.
In the first scenarios, initialization vectors bits are loaded into LFSRc and key bits are loaded
into LFSRd. Then for the first 255 clocks, LFSRc will contain known IV bits, and LFSRd linear
terms in the key bits only. In each time we output degree 10 equations. Then when we start
running the cipher again for 255. In each clock, we will be multiplying three degree 10 terms from
the two register to get degree 30 equations in LFSRd. Then every time we clock the cipher another
two terms of degree 10 are multiplied with degree 10 terms in LFSRd. By the 10 clocks of the
second run, LFSRd will contain degree 80 terms. At the end of the key loading phase and before
the start of the start of the keystream generation phase, we end up with degree 128 terms in both
registers. Figure 2 illustrates.
In the second scenario, the key bits are loaded into LFSRc and IV bits into LFSRd to get
the following. The first output will be of degree 2, and then the degree increases by 2 each clock.
At the end of the first 255 clocks, LFSRc will be filled with terms from degree 2 to degree 128
and LFSRd will be filled with degree 128 terms. For the second 255 clocks, relatively low degree
equations from LFSRc will be multiplied with degree 128 equations form LFSRd. At the end of
the key loading phase and before the start of the keystream generations, both registers will contain
equations of degree 128. Figure 3 illustrates
In view of the way key and IV bits are loaded into the system and resistance to algebraic attacks,
it seems that for LILI-II, it does not make a difference. All three scenarios start at different starting
point of the key loading phase but then end up generating the same degree of equations, degree
128.
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A Algebraic Normal Form of LILI-II Boolean function
Degree 0
1
Degree 1
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x11
13
Degree 2
x1x9 + x2x4 + x3x8 + x5x11 + x6x7 + x7x10 + x7x11 + x7x12 + x10x12
Degree 3
x2x7x11 + x2x7x12 + x4x7x11 + x4x7x12 + x7x10x11 + x7x11x12
Degree 4
x1x2x7x11+x1x2x7x12+x1x3x7x11+x2x7x9x11+x2x7x9x12+x2x7x11x12+x3x4x7x11+x3x7x9x11+
x4x7x11x12 + x7x9x11x12
Degree 5
x1x2x3x7x9+x1x2x7x11x12+x1x3x7x11x12+x1x7x9x11x12+x2x3x4x7x9+x2x3x5x7x9+x2x3x6x7x11+
x2x3x7x8x9+x2x3x7x9x10+x2x3x7x9x11+x2x3x7x9x12+x2x3x7x11x12+x2x3x9x11x12+x2x7x8x9x11+
x2x7x8x9x12+x2x7x9x10x11+x2x7x9x11x12+x3x5x7x11x12+x3x7x8x9x11+x3x7x8x11x12+x3x7x9x10x11+
x4x7x9x11x12 + x7x8x9x11x12 + x7x9x10x11x12
Degree 6
x2x3x4x9x11x12+x2x3x6x7x9x11+x3x4x7x8x9x11+x3x6x7x8x9x11+x2x3x7x10x11x12+x3x7x9x10x11x12+
x3x5x7x8x9x11+x1x2x3x7x10x11+x2x3x6x9x11x12+x2x7x9x10x11x12+x1x3x4x7x11x12+x1x3x7x10x11x12+
x1x2x3x7x9x12+x2x3x6x7x11x12+x3x7x8x9x10x11+x2x3x5x7x11x12+x3x5x6x7x9x11+x1x2x3x7x11x12+
x3x5x6x7x11x12+x1x3x7x8x11x12+x3x4x7x10x11x12+x1x3x5x7x9x11+x2x3x5x7x10x11+x2x3x4x7x10x11+
x2x3x7x8x9x12+x2x3x4x7x9x12+x2x3x8x9x11x12+x3x6x7x8x11x12+x4x5x6x7x8x11+x3x5x7x9x10x11+
x2x3x5x9x11x12+x2x3x9x10x11x12+x3x7x8x9x11x12+x3x4x7x9x11x12+x1x2x3x5x7x11+x1x3x4x7x9x11+
x3x5x7x8x11x12+x2x3x4x5x7x11+x3x6x7x9x11x12+x1x2x3x6x7x11+x2x3x5x7x8x11+x2x3x5x6x7x11+
x1x2x7x9x11x12 + x2x3x7x8x9x11 + x1x2x3x9x11x12 + x3x4x5x7x9x11 + x3x4x6x7x11x12
Degree 7
x3x5x6x7x10x11x12+x2x3x5x7x8x10x11+x1x2x3x6x7x9x11+x1x3x5x7x8x9x11+x2x3x4x6x7x11x12+
x2x3x5x7x8x9x11+x2x3x4x5x6x7x11+x2x3x5x7x10x11x12+x1x3x4x5x7x11x12+x1x3x6x7x9x10x11+
x3x4x6x7x9x10x11+x2x3x4x5x7x11x12+x3x5x6x7x9x11x12+x1x3x6x7x10x11x12+x1x3x6x7x8x11x12+
x4x5x6x7x8x11x12+x2x3x5x6x7x11x12+x1x2x3x5x6x7x11+x2x3x4x7x10x11x12+x3x5x7x8x9x10x11+
x2x4x5x6x7x8x11+x1x3x4x7x9x11x12+x2x3x4x6x7x9x11+x1x2x3x6x7x10x11+x2x3x4x7x9x10x11+
x2x3x6x7x8x9x11+x2x3x4x5x7x8x11+x3x5x6x7x9x10x11+x1x2x3x7x9x10x11+x4x5x6x7x8x10x11+
x1x2x3x7x8x11x12+x3x6x7x9x10x11x12+x1x2x3x4x7x11x12+x2x3x6x7x8x11x12+x3x4x5x6x7x8x11+
x1x2x3x7x10x11x12+x1x3x5x7x8x11x12+x2x3x4x5x7x10x11+x3x4x6x7x10x11x12+x3x4x6x7x9x11x12+
x1x2x3x4x7x9x11+x1x3x5x6x7x9x11+x3x4x7x9x10x11x12+x2x3x5x6x7x9x11+x4x5x6x7x8x9x11+
x3x5x7x8x9x11x12+x1x3x5x6x7x11x12+x2x3x5x7x9x10x11+x1x3x4x7x8x11x12+x3x4x7x8x10x11x12+
x3x6x7x8x9x11x12+x1x3x4x5x7x9x11+x3x5x7x9x10x11x12+x1x3x6x7x8x9x11+x1x3x5x7x10x11x12+
x1x3x5x7x9x11x12+x1x2x3x4x5x7x11+x1x3x4x6x7x9x11+x1x3x7x8x9x11x12+x3x4x6x7x8x11x12+
x2x3x5x7x9x11x12+x3x4x5x7x9x10x11+x1x2x3x4x7x8x11+x1x2x3x4x6x7x11+x3x5x7x8x10x11x12+
x3x5x6x7x8x11x12+x3x6x7x8x10x11x12+x3x6x7x8x9x10x11+x1x2x3x6x7x11x12+x3x4x5x7x8x11x12
Degree 8
x1x2x3x4x6x7x9x11+x2x4x5x6x7x8x10x11+x1x2x3x4x7x8x10x11+x1x2x3x4x7x8x9x11+x3x4x5x6x7x8x10x11+
x4x5x6x7x8x9x11x12+x3x4x7x8x9x10x11x12+x1x2x3x4x6x7x10x11+x2x3x5x7x9x10x11x12+x2x3x5x7x8x10x11x12
x1x2x3x5x6x7x8x11+x1x3x4x7x9x10x11x12+x1x3x6x7x9x10x11x12+x2x3x4x5x7x8x9x11+x3x4x5x7x8x9x11x12+
x3x4x5x6x7x9x10x11+x4x5x6x7x8x9x10x11+x3x4x5x7x9x10x11x12+x2x3x4x5x7x10x11x12+x1x2x3x4x5x7x8x11+
x1x3x5x6x7x10x11x12+x2x4x5x6x7x8x9x11+x2x3x4x5x6x7x10x11+x1x2x3x4x6x7x11x12+x2x3x4x5x6x7x8x11+
x2x3x5x6x7x8x11x12+x1x2x3x5x7x10x11x12+x1x2x3x6x7x8x11x12+x1x2x3x6x7x9x10x11+x2x3x4x7x8x9x11x12+
x2x3x4x6x7x9x10x11+x3x5x6x7x8x9x10x11+x1x3x4x5x6x7x11x12+x2x3x4x5x7x8x10x11+x3x4x5x6x7x8x9x11+
x2x3x4x6x7x8x11x12+x1x3x4x7x8x9x11x12+x2x3x6x7x8x10x11x12+x1x3x5x7x8x9x10x11+x1x2x3x6x7x10x11x12+
14
x1x2x3x4x7x10x11x12+x2x3x6x7x8x9x10x11+x2x3x4x5x6x7x11x12+x1x3x4x6x7x10x11x12+x2x3x5x7x8x9x11x12+
x2x3x4x7x8x10x11x12+x2x3x6x7x8x9x11x12+x2x3x5x6x7x10x11x12+x1x2x3x5x7x9x10x11+x2x3x6x7x9x10x11x12
x1x2x3x5x7x8x11x12+x1x2x3x4x7x9x11x12+x1x3x7x8x9x10x11x12+x2x3x5x6x7x9x10x11+x2x3x7x8x9x10x11x12+
x2x3x4x5x6x7x9x11+x1x2x3x6x7x8x9x11+x2x3x5x6x7x8x9x11+x1x2x3x5x6x7x9x11+x3x4x6x7x8x9x11x12+
x1x2x3x4x7x9x10x11+x1x3x4x5x7x9x10x11+x1x3x5x6x7x9x11x12+x4x5x6x7x8x10x11x12+x2x3x5x6x7x9x11x12+
x3x4x5x6x7x9x11x12+x1x3x6x7x8x9x11x12+x2x3x5x7x8x9x10x11+x2x3x4x6x7x10x11x12+x2x4x5x6x7x8x11x12
Degree 9
x1x3x4x5x6x7x9x11x12+x2x3x4x5x6x7x9x11x12+x2x3x4x7x8x9x10x11x12+x1x2x3x4x6x7x9x10x11+
x1x2x3x4x5x7x8x9x11+x2x3x4x5x7x8x9x10x11+x2x3x5x7x8x9x10x11x12+x1x2x3x4x7x9x10x11x12+
x1x2x3x6x7x9x10x11x12+x4x5x6x7x8x9x10x11x12+x1x2x3x5x7x8x9x11x12+x1x2x3x5x6x7x10x11x12+
x1x2x3x4x5x7x9x11x12+x2x3x4x5x6x7x8x9x11+x3x4x5x6x7x8x9x10x11+x2x4x5x6x7x8x9x10x11+
x1x2x3x4x5x6x7x11x12+x2x3x4x5x6x7x9x10x11+x1x2x3x5x6x7x8x9x11+x1x3x5x6x7x9x10x11x12+
x2x3x4x5x6x7x8x10x11+x2x3x4x6x7x9x10x11x12+x1x2x3x7x8x9x10x11x12+x1x3x4x6x7x9x10x11x12+
x2x4x5x6x7x8x10x11x12+x1x2x3x4x6x7x10x11x12+x2x3x4x6x7x8x9x10x11+x2x4x5x6x7x8x9x11x12
Degree 10
x1x2x3x4x5x6x7x9x11x12+x1x2x3x4x6x7x9x10x11x12+x1x2x3x5x6x7x9x10x11x12+x2x3x4x5x6x7x8x9x10x11+
x2x4x5x6x7x8x9x10x11x12
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Figure 1: Degree increase in the register during key loading of LILI-II
16
Figure 2: Degree increase in the register during key loading of LILI-II for scenario 1
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Figure 3: Degree increase in the register during key loading of LILI-II for scenario 2
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